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Currently controversial issues about the production and distribution of information by the fed-
eral government relate to broader questions about the appropriate scope of governmental ser-
vices and the boundaries of public and private enterprise. Concepts derived from the economic 
analysis of public expenditures provide a framework for examining the purposes of federal in-
formation activities and the advantages and drawbacks of various organizational and financing 
arrangements. Cost-benefit analysis techniques should be explored and developed as assess-
ment tools in the field of government information. 
here are three key issues in the 
current conflict about federal 
information policy: 
1. What information should 
the federal government make available to 
the public? 
2. Should government information be 
transmitted to the public via governmen-
tal or private means? 
3. Should the costs of transmission be 
borne by the public at large or by the users 
of the information? 
The questions are long-standing, but 
the controversy has heated up during the 
past few years as a result of several con-
verging factors. 
The Reagan administration propounds 
a governmental philosophy that departs 
in significant ways from previous admin-
istrations. A central aim is to reduce social 
intervention by government. This has the 
effect of reducing the government's infor-
mation output, because data collected to 
guide policy are no longer needed when 
the policy area is removed from the range 
of governmental concerns. It also inhibits 
. the provision of information as a govern-
ment service to the public. In addition, 
there is a heightened concern with control 
of the information reaching the public, a 
concern that is manifested in restrictions 
on public access to information in the gov-
ernment's possession. 
Concurrently, there is an expanding in-
formation market, abetted by technologi-
cal advances. Availability of information 
by electronic transmission opens new ave-
nues of dissemination and increased 
profit possibilities for the private informa-
tion industry. This development coincides 
with the Reagan administration's inclina-
tion to reduce the scope of government by 
placing as many functions as possible in 
the hands of the private sector. The results 
are less government output of informa-
tion, more restricted access to government 
files, transfer of information activities for-
merly conducted by government agencies 
to private firms, and higher charges to in-
formation users .. 1 · 
Thelma Freides is Head, Reader Seroices, at State University of New York, Purchase, New York 10577. 
The author wishes to thank Jacob ]. Kaufman for helpful suggestions concerning the economic concepts dis-
cussed in this paper. 
425 
426 College & Research Libraries 
The library community's strong and un-
equivocal opposition to these trends has 
been grounded mainly in appeals to dem-
ocratic values. In the United States there is 
a basic presumption, buttressed by both 
law and tradition, of public access to infor-
mation created or held by the federal gov-
ernment, with minimal restraint. 2 It is 
deemed an essential precondition of dem-
ocratic government for citizens to be able 
to discover, and thus to judge, what the 
government is doing. Any general restric-
tion is seen as objectionable, and eco-
nomic restrictions particularly unjustifi-
able because they violate the basic equality 
of citizens. Proceeding from this orienta-
tion, the American Library Association 
has repeatedly ''reaffirmed its long stand-
ing conviction that o~en government is vi-
tal to a democracy.'' 
THE PROBLEM 
The open government argument is valid 
and persuasive, but it leaves some impor-
tant questions unaddressed. 
First, information distributed by gov-
ernment includes both information about 
government and information about other 
matters disseminated as a government 
service to the public. The former group 
consists essentially of byproducts of other 
government activities, and includes docu-
ments generated by the legislative pro-
cess, the administrative and regulatory 
records of government agencies, and sta-
tistics and other data collected to inform 
policy decisions. Democratic values sup-
port an assertion that this is public prop-
erty and all citizens are the owners, pos-
sessing proprietary rights to acquire and 
use the information their government has 
created. But other information is made 
available as a government service, created 
and distributed by government only for 
the purpose of aiding people in their pri-
vate pursuits. The Government Printing 
Office best-seller Infant Care4 is a classic ex-
ample. 
Many government publications are is-
sued to help people, in one way or an-
other, earn a living through better farming 
or business practices. The cr'itical question 
becomes, what is the appropriate extent of 
this kind of government service? Answers 
are cast in terms of the social benefit re-
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suiting from a particular information ac-
tivity, rather than the requirements of a 
democratic government and the rights of 
its citizens. 
A second problem is that to assert a right 
of access does not deal with questions 
about the resource allocations required to 
make the right effective. If citizens have 
the right to use governmental informa-
tion, do citizens have a corresponding ob-
ligation to provide the means of access as 
taxpayers? Is this obligation limited by the 
magnitude of the costs involved, by the 
number of people who benefit as com-
pared with the number who have to pay, 
or by the private gain made possible from 
inf~rmation provided at the taxpayers' ex-
pense? 
These questions touch a much broader 
issue than information policy: establish-
ing equal rights in an economically une-
qual society. Rights are, by definition, 
''distributed universally and equal~ and 
free of charge to all adult citizens." They 
embody values that are deliberately 
placed beyond the range of economic dis-
tinctions, because ''society refuses to tum 
itself into a giant vending machine that de-
livers anything and everything in return 
for the proper number of coins. " 6 None-
theless, "any entitlement is more likely to 
be established as a right when it has rela-
tively low resource costs . ... It is much 
less expensive, in every sense, to fulfill the 
right to free speech than a 'right' to free 
food. " 7 
Considerations of this kind probably 
underlie the question posed by the Ad 
Hoc Advisory Committee on Government 
Publications in its report to the Congres-
sional Joint Committee on Printing: 
Should the information generated by the gov-
ernment be considered as an economic good to 
be dealt with in purely economic terms, or as a 
social good to be dealt with in purely social 
terms, or a combination of both?8 
This formulation has been echoed in 
other discussions of Rea~an administra-
tion information policies, but asking the 
question in this way gives no help at all to-
ward an answer. It is unlikely that any 
government activity can be dealt with in 
purely. economic terms, because govern-
ment actions in the economic sphere are 
almost always intended to alter economic 
relationships to serve social ends. Yet, no 
matter how socially desirable an activity 
may be, it consumes resources that are 
thereby unavailable for other uses, and 
there is no way to avoid asking whether a 
given use of a resource is superior to other 
uses, which is to deal with the question in 
economic terms. Likewise, where the so-
cial gain resulting from an activity does 
not flow universally and equally to all, 
there is no way to avoid another economic 
question, which is who benefits and who 
pays. Obviously, the answer to the Ad 
Hoc Committee's question is "a combina-
tion of both," but what sort of combina-
tion? 
THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
In several important respects the federal 
information issue is a particular case of the 
broad constellation of questions having to 
do with government's responsibility to 
provide for the needs of the population 
and society's arrangements for adjusting 
economic relationships to conform to so-
cial values. Questions of this type are ex-
amined extensively in the economic litera-
ture on public expenditures in which two 
basic roropositions are generally encoun-
tered: 0 . 
1. Government intervention in eco-
nomic processes stems from a discernible 
rationale and follows certain patterns in 
order to achieve defined goals. The appro-
priateness of the intervention is judged in 
relation to the goal and the various possi-
bilities for achieving it. 
2. Intervention by government means 
that resources are usually not allocated the 
same as resources in the free market. The 
use of public funds does not mandate any 
particular form or agency of production or 
distribution, e.g., public or private, or any 
particular allocation of costs. Many orga-
nizational and pricing arrangements are 
possible. Their desirability varies relative 
to other factors. 
What follows is an examination from an 
economic perspective of the three key fed-
eral information issues enumerated at the 
outset of this paper. While economic anal-
ysis will not resolve the government infor-
mation controversy, it does provide a use-
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ful tool for identifying ends and means, 
and for sorting out the assumptions and 
choices underlying policy issues. 
CONDITIONS OF PUBLIC 
INTERVENTION INTO 
MARKET ALLOCATION 
The normal expectation in market econ-
omies is that the market allocates re-
sources to the production of goods and 
services in response to consumer de-
mand. The aggregate of economic choices 
made by individuals in accordance with 
their personal priorities and preferences 
produces the most efficient allocation of 
resources for the economy as a whole, i.e., 
maximum output for a given input. Gov-
ernment intervenes in the market, replac-
ing individual consumer choice with col-
lective political choice, when the market is 
unable to make the necessary allocations, 
or when market allocation contravenes 
goals other than efficiency. This occurs 
under the following circumstances: 11 
Collective Goods 
These are goods and services whose use 
cannot be confined to those who pay for 
them, because once produced they are 
equally available to all, e.g., national de-
fense, flood control, street cleaning, and 
lighthouses. Because there is no way to 
prevent the free use of such goods, the 
market cannot determine their value or 
the quantity to be produced. Government 
therefore allocates these resources by po-
litiCal decision and people are taxed to pay 
for them. In economic language, the abil-
ity to limit access to a good to those who 
pay for it is called the exclusion principle. 
Collective goods by their nature cannot be 
subject to the exclusion principle. 
Economies of Scale; Monopolies 
Some goods and services cannot be sup-
plied successfully by the free market be-
cause no competition exists. For products 
requiring extensive capital investment, 
the cost per unit may decrease as the 
quantity produced increases, e.g., gas and 
electric power generation, rail transit, and 
water and sewage systems. Production 
yields the most output for the least cost if 
there is only one producer; however in 
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monopoly situations there is no market 
mechanism to limit the price the monopo-
list is able to charge. Government there-
fore awards the field to a single producer 
and controls the price through a regula-
tory process (public utility franchises and 
rate-setting commissions) or by direct 
government operation of the enterprise 
(municipal water and transit systems.) 
Externalities, or Spillover Effects 
Some goods have important effects on 
people who are not consumers. Fire pro-
tection could be limited to property own-
ers who pay for it, but when a fire in a non-
payer's house is extinguished others 
benefit. Education confers increased earn-
ing power on those who receive it, but em-
ployers also gain from a literate, hence 
more productive labor force, and the ben-
efits of a more productive economy accrue 
to the society at large. Projects requiring 
very large or long-term investment may 
yield indirect returns that investors can-
not recoup. By increasing the revenues of 
hotels and restaurants a convention center 
yields returns in excess of its direct reve-
nues. Thus, the project may be worth-
while as a public venture even if it would 
not be sufficiently profitable as a private 
venture. Basic scientific research may 
eventually yield large profits from com-
mercial applications, but this research is 
often undertaken by government because 
the gains are too distant or uncertain to at-
tract private resources. 
The difference between the total value 
of a good and its market value is described 
by the term externality or spillover. Exter-
nalities can be negative as well as positive, 
representing costs as well as benefits. In-
dustrial pollution is a negative externality, 
meaning that the market has no way to im-
pose that cost of production on the pol-
luter. The government intervenes to make 
the necessary adjustment by tax or regula-
tion. Externalities are not necessarily or 
exclusively monetary. An architecturally 
beautiful building, for example, benefits 
all who view it, in addition to those who 
pay rent to occupy it. In such circum-
stances private owners normally charge 
the aesthetic contribution to philanthropy 
or public relations. Government some-
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times imposes aesthetic considerations on 
market calculations through zoning or 
laws protecting landmark buildings. 
To summarize, where productive pro-
cesses generate significant externalities, 
government commonly intervenes to fill 
the gap between the value of the good to 
single consumers and its value to society 
as a whole. In some instances the exclu-
sion principle is disregarded and the good 
or service is made available to all without 
charge, becoming, in effect, a collective 
good, as in the case of fire protection or 
public elementary education. This tends 
to occur when consumption of the good is 
spread more or less equally through the 
population. Where consumption is not 
universal or equal the good is likely to be 
sold, but at a price below the cost of pro-
duction, as in the case of public transit or 
public universities. 
Income Redistribution 
Many goods and services are provided 
by government in order to bring about a 
more equitable distribution of income 
than results from market forces. Income 
transfers of all kinds, such as farm subsi-
dies, public housing, low-interest loans, 
and tax expenditures, come under this 
heading. Such redistribution almost al-
ways creates a positive externality, in that 
the benefits, e.g., a more prosperous 
economy, social peace, or scientific prog-
ress, accrue to the whole society as well as 
to the direct beneficiaries. 
There is a fairly clear difference in em-
phasis, however, and for present pur-
poses it is useful to place government ex-
penditures aimed at bringing about 
production of goods that are not profitable 
for the private market in the externalities 
category, and to attribute those intended 
to redistribute access to goods that are, or 
can be, available in the private sector to in-
come redistribution. 
CONDITIONS OF PUBLIC 
INFORMATION PRODUCTION 
Of the four concepts identified as bases 
for government economic intervention-
collective goods, economies of scale, ex-
ternalities, and income redistribution-
the latter -two are most relevant to , 
information production. Very few, if any, 
information products are true collective 
goods, as it is just about always possible to 
limit consumption to those who pay. 
Some information is produced under con-
ditions resembling monopoly, in that the 
market is too small to support more than 
one producer, but the possibility of econo-
mies of scale is outweighed by free speech 
considerations, so the public utility model 
is not normally seen as applicable. (This 
model may have some relevance to infor-
mation distribution, as distinguished 
from production, and will be considered 
from that perspective in connection with 
privatization and pricing issues.) 
The bulk of government information ac-
tivity is accounted for by the concepts of 
externalities and income redistribution. It 
was postulated earlier that access to gov-
ernment records is a necessary condition 
for operation of a democratic political sys-
tem. Availability of these records gener-
ates externalities: that is, benefits accrue 
not only to those who actually consult the 
records but to all citizens, because all ben-
efit from the existence of open, democratic 
government. Similarly, availability of sta-
tistical data derived from censuses and 
surveys improves decision making in all 
spheres. This compares to the manner in 
which education contributes to increased 
productivity. Thus, even though there are 
highly profitable commercial uses of cen-
sus data, the value to society as a whole is 
considered to be greater than the market 
value. Because of this difference, the pro-
duction of censuses and other large-scale 
statistical projects is undertaken by gov-
ernment rather than left to private initia-
tive. 
Information activities directed toward 
income redistribution make available 
without charge, or at lower cost, informa-
tion that can also be purchased on the pri-
vate market. Infant Care is an example, as 
are many of the "how to" publications ad-
dressed to farmers, business people, 
homemakers, and so forth. 
Again, the externalities and income re-
distribution categories, while different, 
overlap. All income redistribution activi-
ties are undertaken in the belief that they 
provide benefits to the society at large, 
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and from that perspective are simply a 
variant of the externalities concept. It is 
nonetheless important to distinguish be-
tween information products that are 
uniquely governmental and those that 
have counterparts in the private sector, · 
because the distinction provides a basis 
for conceptualizing government informa-
tion activities in relation to the ends they 
serve. 
For example, government statistics on 
such matters as wages, strikes, and occu-
pational injuries are widely used in labor-
management relations. It might be asked 
why those who use the information do not 
provide it for themselves, i.e., buy it from 
data collection companies who could do 
what the government does now, which is 
to tabulate and distribute data reported 
from the private sector. That might, it is 
true, place labor at a disadvantage relative 
to management, and if the government's 
purpose in producing the statistics is to 
keep the price low, that is a case of income 
redistribution. A more fundamental con-
sideration, however, is that statistics pro-
duced by the private sector are qualita-
tively not the same as government's. Only 
government has the ability through trust, 
legal coercion, or both to elicit the compre-
hensive response that statistical accuracy 
requires, and acceptability of governmen-
tal data to contending economic interests 
rests to a considerable extent on govern-
ment's unique status as a disinterested 
neutral party. Both business and labor in-
terests cite these reasons, more than cost 
or ability to pay, in suJ>port of government 
statistical programs. 
The Medline/Excerpta Medica contro-
versy provides a similar example. Critics 
of Medline and the other bibliographic en-
terprises of the National Library of Medi-
cine hold that government services are 
produced under heavily subsidized condi-
tions and thereby compete unfairly with 
privately produced services such as Ex-
cerpta Medica. 13 Defenders of Medline 
counter that Excerpta Medica's real com-
petitive disadvantage is not its higher 
price but Medline' s qualitative superior-
ity, which derives from the unique re-
sources and expertise of the National Li-
brary of Medicine and cannot be matched 
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by a private competitor. 14 Assuming that 
Medline is indeed priced below its cost of 
production (a point that is neither con-
ceded by the defenders nor demonstrated 
by the critics) that still leaves the question 
of what the public subsidy buys: access to 
medical data for researchers who other-
wise could not afford to buy it, i.e., in-
come redistribution, or availability of 
medical data at a quality level that other-
wise would not exist for anyone, i.e., ex-
ternalities. 
Distinguishing the concept of external-
ities from that of income redistribution is 
also useful in relation to the pricing of gov-
ernment information services. If the aim 
of the government activity is to create a 
product that would otherwise not exist, it 
is reasonable to expect the users of the 
product to support its cost in relation to 
the value received. If the aim is income re-
distribution, it is reasonable to alloc.ate the 
costs on the basis of ability to pay. The 
matter will be examined more closely in 
the discussion of cost allocation. 
COST -BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS 
A DECISION-MAKING TOOL 
The foregoing review of government eco-
nomic intervention suggests that the an-
swer to What information services should 
the government provide? is: those that 
yield a social benefit in excess of the return 
that can be expected in the market. How-
ever, this answer only establishes the plau-
sibility of such an activity. Its necessity is 
not established nor is a way suggested for 
choosing among competing alternatives. 
Decisions about the allocation of re-
sources generally involve comparison of 
costs and expected returns, and the cho-
sen alternative is generally the one that of-
fers the largest margin of value over cost. 
In private economic calculations, value 
corresponds to the price paid in the mar-
ket. Because government expenditures 
are undertaken precisely where market 
prices cannot guide the allocation of re-
sources, the value, or expected return, of a 
project must be estimated on some other 
basis. Cost-benefit analysis is the term used 
to denote a set of techniques employed for 
measuring the value of public projects. 
The cost-benefit concept is sometimes 
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disparaged as a rationalization for govern-
ment inaction or retrenchment. "Anyone 
with any knowledge of cost-benefit analy-
sis knows how much hocus-pocus there is 
in this kind of numbers-juggling. It is rela-
tively easy to come up with cost figures, 
but very difficult to measure benefits."15 
Many librarians apparently subscribe to 
this view, 16 but what the argument lacks is 
an alternative to "numbers-juggling." All 
government projects are assumed to yield 
a surplus of social benefits over costs but if 
the benefit cannot be measured, how can 
one know that a surplus is really there? 
Government information is quite vul-
nerable in this respect because there is al-
most no hard knowledge about its use and 
purported social benefits. Additionally, 
there is a strong, albeit impressionistic, 
perception of ''widespread lack of appre-
ciation of the potential value of docu-
ments."17 A decision by the Government 
Printing Office in 1982 to eliminate stocks 
of publications selling fewer than fifty 
copies annually was criticized by librari-
ans, 18 but it was at least an attempt to re-
late a public expenditure to evidence of 
public benefit. To argue against the deci-
sion one would have to assert that keeping 
the publications available, even at low lev-
els of demand, is worth the cost of storage, 
and the question is whether such argu-
ments are to be based on evidence of any 
sort, or only "unsupported opinion and 
emotive rhetoric.' '19 Viewed from this per-
spective, out-of-hand rejection of cost-
benefit approaches may be a greater t,h~eat 
to the unfettered flow of government in-
formation, especially in the long run, than 
the ''shrink government'' proclivities of 
the Reagan administration. 
Because quantitative measurement fa-
cilities comparison, cost-benefit tech-
niques generally attempt to quantify bene-
fits whenever possible, usually by 
postulating some monetary surrogate for 
the government service in question. For 
example, the value of public recreational 
facilities might be partially equated to the 
price people are willing to pal for use of 
comparable private facilities. This does 
not mean that factors lacking obvious 
monetary equivalents are disregarded and 
that only money counts. "There is ... 
nothing wrong in quantifying the quanti-
fiable and leaving the qualitative factors in 
list form for consideration by the decision 
maker.' ' 21 The critical point is the need for 
detailed scrutiny of all the factors entering 
into a decision. ''At the very least, such a 
process enables attention to be focused on 
the question of whether the unmeasurable 
benefits are deemed impressive enough to 
justify sustainin~ the measurable costs 
that they entail." 
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
Economic intervention by government 
means only that resources are allocated to 
the production of goods and services by 
collective political decision, rather than by 
individual demand in the marketplace. 
Governmental intervention does not re-
quire that government actually produce 
the product, and normal' government 
practice admits a range of possibilities. 
Some goods and services are provided di-
rectly by government, e.g., public hous-
ing; some are purchased by government 
from the private sector for public use, e.g., 
military weapons and uniforms, surplus 
farm products. Government sometimes 
gives consumers funds for purchases in 
the private market, e.g., housing vouch-
ers, food stamps, and sometimes pays the 
bills incurred by consumers in the private 
market, e.g., Medicare. 
In the information debate, the private 
sector argues for a general presumption in 
favor of private over public distribution 
channels for government information. 
The position is grounded in Bureau of the 
Budget Circular A-76, the definitive policy 
statement on federal and private sector 
economic activities promulgated initially 
during the Johnson administration. Circu-
lar A-76, enunciating "the Government's 
general policy of relying on the private en-
terprise system to supply its needs,'' actu-
ally covers only goods and services pro-
cured for government use and excludes 
government services provided to the pub-
lic. 23 More recently, Office of Management 
and Budget Circular A-130, issued in De-
cember 1985 under the title ''Management 
of Federal Information Resources," ex-
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plicitly extended the A-76 principles to the 
information field. 24 While the circular's 
language is general enough to allow vary-
ing interpretations, there are several state-
ments to the effect that federal agencies 
are expected to disseminate their informa-
tion products via the private sector unless 
there are clear and compelling reasons not 
to, and are to refrain from undertaking in-
formation activities that the private sector 
is ready to perform. 25 Although a blanket 
preference for private over public enter-
prise is essentially an ideological rather 
than an economic judgment, some eco-
nomic considerations are relevant. 
Circulars A-76 and A-130 provide that 
services purchased by government from 
the private sector are not to cost the tax-
payers more than the same activities per-
formed by government. 26 Private-sector 
advocates allege that governmental costs 
are habitually understated because rele-
vant items are absorbed into general gov-
ernmental operations. 27 Comparative cost 
calculations should include not only the 
government's direct expenditures but also 
less obvious items such as interest costs of 
invested capital and tax revenues that 
would be generated by private operations. 
''The real cost of a thing is what one must 
do without in order to get that thing,' '28 or 
the most highly valued alternative use of 
the resource in question, and the "hid-
den'' costs of a public enterprise are as 
much a charge on the public as actual dol-
lar outlays. 
This line of reasoning suggests an addi-
tional consideration. The private pur-
veyor of government information is pro-
vided at public expense with the raw 
materials that are a normal charge on any 
business. In itself this is not a factor in 
comparing costs of government and pri-
vate dissemination (assuming that the pub-
lic bears the expense of creating the infor-
mation because of positive externalities), 
but there is no reason to assume that the 
entrepreneur receives the public resource 
as an unconditional gift in perpetuity. The 
government has an obligation to protect 
the public interest by monitoring the cost 
of access to public information dissemi-
nated through private channels. There is 
no more justification for the government 
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to turn over an information resource to a 
private entrepreneur for distribution 
without specifying the pricing arrange-
ments than there would be for a city to 
franchise electric power distribution or 
public transit without provision for rate 
regulation. OMB Circular A-130 acknowl-
edges the point, admonishing agencies to 
''take care that they do not permit contrac-
tors to exercise monopolistic controls, " 29 
but there is evidence that the instruction is 
not always followed. 30 Government may 
also use quite legitimately the prospect of 
its own entry into the market as a means to 
ensure the economic use of resources cre-
ated at public expense. 31 
Cost comparisons necessarily assume 
that identical products are being com-
pared, yet this may not always be the case 
for governmentally and privately pro-
duced information products. The qualities 
o£ economic statistics and medical biblio-
graphic services that may be uniquely 
governmental were mentioned earlier. 
Historically, dissatisfaction with the pri-
vate publication of government records 
led to the establishment of the Govern-
ment Printing Office. 32 
There are other possible qualitative dif-
ferences. It has been suggested that gov-
ernment dissemination carries the risk of 
government control and manipulation of 
information reaching the public, and also 
that private enterprise is more innovative 
than government. 33 The presence or ab-
sence of competition is relevant to both 
points. In situations that do not lend 
themselves to competitive arrangements, 
a single private producer exercises the 
same control as government, and is nor-
mally less subject to accountability con-
straints in the form of open records, pre-
scribed and formalized decision-making 
procedures, and legislative oversight. 
Similarly, if government bureaucrats are 
necessarily cautious about risking public 
funds on untried ventures, 34 incentives to 
innovate in the private sector are greatest 
where many firms compete for a given 
market. Where a single seller dominates, 
incentives to risk are correspondingly re-
duced, and where government is the only 
customer for private producers working 
under contract, the effects of bureaucratic 
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caution should be much the same as in a 
government enterprise. 
The point is that governmental and pri-
vate information services are not necessar-
ily interchangeable, and the effect of pub-
lic or private operations on the quality of 
the information is as relevant a consider-
ation as cost or doctrine. 
COST ALLOCATION 
Suggestions to sell government infor-
mation are likely to encounter the objec-
tion that people should not have to pay for 
access to government information that 
their taxes paid to create. 35 The economic 
flaw in this argument is the assumption 
that the cost of information is equivalent 
to the cost of producing it. In reality there 
are distribution as well as production 
costs, which means that no matter who 
may have paid t6 create the information, 
the costs of distribution must also be paid. 
When information is distributed without 
charge, all citizens pay twice, sharing 
through their taxes the costs of both pro-
duction and distribution. When govern-
ment information is sold, direct users pay 
twice, for production via taxes and again 
for distribution via user charges, but the 
public pays only for production. In fact 
our society is replete with tax-created as-
sets for which taxpayers are required to 
pay twice, e.g.; toll roads and bridges, na-
tional parks, and public universities. It 
may be argued that information should 
not be subject to user charges even if parks 
and universities are, but user charges are 
not wrong in principle simply because tax 
dollars have created the asset in question. 
Some writers assert a right to be in-
formed as essential for "the citizen's 
knowledgeable ~articipation in the demo-
cratic process." Without further qualifi-
cation it~ difficult to see free distribution 
of government publications as the most ef-
fective way to advance such a right. As 
noted earlier, a great many government 
publications have little or nothing to do 
with _public policy and the issues of the 
day. Moreover, the well-informed citizen 
depends as much on reports and com-
mentaries from nongovernmental sources 
as on information supplied by govern-
ment. The goal of raising the information 
level of the public would probably be bet-
ter served by free distribution of newspa-
per subscriptions, or at least larger subsi-
dies to public libraries, than by blanket 
free distribution of government publica-
tions. 
A case for the free distribution of some 
government information as a requirement 
of the democratic process can be formu-
lated on the basis of the concept of exter-
nalities. As stated earlier, goods and ser-
vices that confer large social benefits, and 
are consumed more or less equally by ev-
eryone, tend to be turned into collective 
goods and made available to all without 
charge. By similar reasoning, the most im-
portant benefit of the availability to the 
public of the records of government 
actions and policy deliberations is the ex-
istence of the open, democratic society 
that depends on open records. Because 
the benefits of the open society are equal 
for all, the personal benefits to individuals 
who actually consult the government rec-
ords may be seen as relatively incidental. 
This argument is applicable to the public 
records reflecting governmental decisions 
and the processes of policy formation, ma-
terials whose principal use outside of gov-
ernment is for investigation and assess-
ment of governmental behavior. The 
point is weaker, though tenable, when ap-
plied to general social data, such as census 
materials, which, though widely em-
ployed for private purposes, figure impor-
tantly in the conduct of public business. 
With respect to the many publications 
used mainly by individuals in their private 
capacities, including the government's 
large output of scientific and technical re-
ports, it does not seem unreasonable that 
those who benefit the most should bear 
the largest share of the cost. It may be de-
sirable to ensure that insufficient funds 
are not a barrier to access, but that is an ar-
gument for income redistribution rather 
than equal access per se, and raises the 
question of whether that goal is best 
achieved by free distribution of the infor-
mation to all users, or by direct subsidy of 
those unable to pay. 
The crux of many contentious-
privatization and user-charge issues is the 
effect on depository libraries; specifically, 
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whether information should be available 
without charge to depositories. There is a 
tendency to equate free access to govern-
ment information with free distribution of 
government publications to selected li-
braries under the depository system. 37 In 
reality, some distance separates free and 
equal access from current depository ar-
rangements. 
First, the depository system does not 
eliminate economic inequality as a differ-
entiating factor in access to government 
publications. Libraries determine the ex-
tent of their depository collections and 
bear all the staffing and operating ex-
penses. This means that citizen access to 
government information in depository li-
braries varies with the wealth of the partic-
ular institution housing the depository 
and its assessment of the value of govern-
ment information relative to its other con-
cerns. 
Second, although open to all, deposi-
tory collections and services are princi-
pally directed to a small minority of the 
population. Most depositories are in aca-
demic libraries and select the publications 
they receive in response to academic re-
quirements. Although the logical informa-
tion conduit for the public at large is the 
public library, fewer than one-quarter of 
the depositbries are in public libraries. 38 
Third, the distribution of publications to 
depository libraries omits some informa-
tion in federal hands to which the public 
has a right of access, but a right that is 
heavily qualified by economic consider-
ations. For example, under the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, corporations are required to 
report certain financial information to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Likewise, under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, candidates and po-
litical committees are required to file fi-
nancial reports with the Federal Election 
Commission. In both cases the reporting 
requirements were enacted expressly to 
expose activities to public scrutiny, but the 
public's only access to the information is 
by traveling to Washington to inspect the 
records or purchasing the data from pri-
vate suppliers. Government files are open 
equally to all under the Freedom of Infor- . 
: 
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mation Act but those unable to pay the 
costs of such inquiries cannot have re-
course to depository libraries as an alter-
native. 
Historically, it does not appear that any 
clear goal or purpose was ever specified 
for the depository system. 39 Hence, it is 
not surprising that no consistent purpose 
is reflected in depository operations. If 
free and equal access to essential govern-
ment information is seen as a matter of 
governmental responsibility toward all 
citizens, it is necessary to determine just 
what information is covered and ensure 
its uniform availability. This raises the 
question of federal subsidies for deposi-
tory operation. 40 Based on the foregoing, 
there is a stronger case for expenditure of 
public funds on a defined and limited pro-
gram of information availability than for 
the present diffuse subsidy to arbitrarily 
and accidentally selected libraries. If the 
depository system is meant to be a public 
subsidy to aid libraries to achieve their in-
stitutional goals, it is worthwhile to con-
sider the advantages and disadvantages of 
free distribution of government publica-
tions as compared with federal payments 
to underwrite library purchases. 
Replacing free or below-cost distribu-
tion with user charges and direct subsidy 
would encourage value comparisons be-
tween government information and non-
governmental alternatives. There is little 
doubt, f.or example, that the below-cost 
ERIC service is used in many research sit-
uations where it would not be chosen on 
grounds of suitability alone. The greatest 
economy for taxpayers is achieved when 
each dollar is spent where it brings the 
maximum return, and rational choice is 
possible only when prices correspond to 
costs. 
Direct subsidy also has the advantage of 
confining the public payment to those for 
whom the benefit is intended. Under con-
ditions of free or below-cost availability, 
commercial users of census data are subsi-
dized to the same extent as local govern-
ments. Medline is available at the same 
low rates to the pharmaceutical industry 
as to medical schools and hospitals. Situa-
tions such as these suggest the possibility 
of differential pricing. This pricing could 
September 1986 
range from full subsidy to full cost recov-
ery for different classes of users. Ques-
tions to be considered are (1) whether the 
same subsidy for all users is warranted in 
terms of the social ends to be served, and 
(2) whether prospective revenues would 
repay the cost of maintaining a differential 
price structure. 
Differential pricing might also be used 
in situations where distribution of govern-
ment information is contracted out to pri-
vate firms. A condition of such contracts 
could be extension of free or below-cost 
access to favored users, such as libraries or 
universities. In that case the subsidy 
would be at the expense of the full-cost us-
ers of the information rather than the pub-
lic, a practice that could be justified as par-
tial repayment of the public investment in 
producing the information. 
Economic and equity considerations 
aside, hidden subsidies itt the form of free 
or below-cost distribution may be easier to 
achieve politically than direct payments or 
differential pricing. This is a serious prac-
tical consideration, but it does not provide 
a moral or philosophical basis for a general 
stance on the issue of user charges. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Viewing federal information from the 
perspective of .economic propositions 
about public expenditure offers ways of 
focusing on specific purposes and out-
comes of government information activi-
ties. Perhaps the principal conclusion to 
emerge is that it is seldom, if ever, practi-
cal to generalize about government infor-
mation and government publications. 
Any generalization necessarily rests on as-
sumptions concerning the information's 
origins, purposes, and uses. It is valid 
only to the extent that the assumptions ap-
ply. As reported by the Public Sec-
tor/Private Sector Task Force of the Na-
tional Commission on Libraries and 
Information Science: 
Most of the Task Force deliberations focused on 
the availability of ''government information,'' 
but the definition of the term fluctuated widely 
during the discussion .... (U)sers interpret the 
term to mean what they want (or, in some 
cases, don't want) the term to cover.41 
The preceding discussion has shown that 
virtually all of the values and principles in-
voked to support one or another position 
in the information debate-open govern-
ment, economic justice, free enterprise 
tradition-are valid with reference to 
some government information activities 
and are questionable or irrelevant in other 
contexts. The heat and acrimony of the 
documents debate are generated by ex-
tending, to the topic as a whole, assump-
tions and arguments that are relevant only 
to selected aspects. 
Another pervasive theme is that virtu-
ally any decision concerning government 
information is a decision about the ex-
penditure of public funds. Policy choices 
are always tradeoffs, in which certain val-
ues are gained and others sacrificed. The 
precept that ''government has a responsi-
bility to make available the information 
collected and created by it' ' 42 addresses 
only one side of the equation, an im-
balance that can lead to quite irrational 
results. For example, GPO now distrib-
utes reprints of articles from commercial 
journals written by scientists employed by 
federal agencies to depository librariesY 
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This absurdly wasteful practice is admit-
tedly an extreme case, but it is mentioned 
here to underscore a basic point: the dis-
semination of government information at 
public expense should not be automati-
cally assumed to be in ''the public inter-
est." 
Opposition to the restrictive tendencies 
of the Reagan administration and the com-
mercial self-interest of the information in-
dustry is natural and justified for librari-
ans. That need not mean unyielding 
defense of the status quo or rejection of 
economic reality. The economic perspec-
tive outlined here suggests a way to re-
place global and unenlightening concepts 
such as the public interest with consider-
ation of specific ends, means and side ef-
fects, based on recognition that every pub-
lic policy choice entails gains and losses 
for someone. There are no single, univer-
sally correct answers to the central ques-
tions enumerated at the start of this paper, 
but there can be a critical, balance sheet 
orientation, assessing the available 
choices in terms of who gains, who loses, 
what, and how much. 
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